Arithmetization of Syntax
Gödel numbering assigns a natural number to every symbol, expression, formula, and deduction, turning statements about syntax into statements about numbers. The syntactic operations — substitution, "is a wff", "is an axiom", "d codes a deduction of a" — come out primitive recursive and hence representable in the subtheory, which lets a formula of arithmetic talk about formulas, including itself.
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In the finitely axiomatized subtheory , every recursive relation is representable: a relation is representable when some formula proves the right instance for every tuple, giving and giving . Representability now applies to syntax itself, through two constructions.1
- Coding. Assertions about wffs can be converted into assertions about natural numbers, by assigning a number to every expression.
- Internalizing. Many of those (English) assertions about numbers translate into the formal language, and is strong enough to prove the translations.
A formula that expresses a fact about numbers can then express a fact about a formula, including itself.
Gödel numbers
The symbols of the language of are the parameters and the logical symbols, each assigned an integer by a fixed function . Parameters get even numbers, logical symbols odd ones.
| Parameter | Logical symbol | ||
|---|---|---|---|
Thus , , and . Nothing depends on the
particular table; all that is required is that the language be recursively
numbered — that be a one-to-one map from parameters into the even numbers
for which the relations is the value of at some -place predicate symbol
and is the value of at some -place function symbol
are both
representable in . For the language of these two
sets are finite (the predicate set is just for ),
so the condition holds trivially.2
The sequence encoding is
the one from the subtheory: its length function , its decoding
(the exponent of , minus one), and its concatenation are all
recursive. The in the exponent keeps a trailing zero from vanishing, so
distinct sequences receive distinct numbers.
For example, the numeral (which names ) is the string , so
A formula codes the same way once written with primitive symbols. Atomic formulas are in prefix (Polish) form, so is the string , and abbreviates .
To a set of expressions we assign the set of their Gödel numbers. A sequence of expressions (for instance a deduction ) is coded one level up, by taking the sequence number of the individual Gödel numbers, . The two-level encoding maps an entire proof to a single integer.
Representable syntactic relations
Under the coding, the operations of syntax become relations and
functions on the natural numbers, and those are representable in
. Throughout, representable
with no theory named means
representable in . The catalog below is proved item by item;
each proof rewrites an inductive definition of a syntactic class as a recursion
on Gödel numbers, then checks that the recursion falls inside the representable
functions using bounded quantification and the recursion results of the
subtheory.3
- Variables. The set of Gödel numbers of variables is , immediately representable.
- Terms. The set of Gödel numbers of terms is representable. A term is either a variable or a function symbol applied to shorter terms, and each constituent has a smaller Gödel number, so the characteristic function is defined by recursion. The only subtlety is bounding the quantifier over the constituent sequence, which one does with .
- Atomic formulas, wffs. Both sets of Gödel numbers are representable, by the same pattern: transcribe the inductive definition into a recursion on Gödel numbers and bound each internal quantifier.
- Substitution. There is a representable function with for a term or formula , variable , and term . Substitution is defined by six clauses (recurse through the connectives and skip a quantifier that binds ); each clause is a representable relation, and no two clauses can apply at once, so the graph is single-valued.
- Free occurrence. The relation with iff occurs free in is representable, because occurs free in exactly when : substituting for changes iff was actually there to change.
- Sentences, substitutability, generalizations. The sets of Gödel numbers of sentences (a wff with no free variable), of substitutable-triples ( is free for in ), and of the relation (one formula is a generalization of another) are all representable.
- Tautologies. The set of Gödel numbers of tautologies is representable. The informal decision procedure is truth tables; recast on Gödel numbers, one extracts the list of prime constituents of a formula, encodes a truth assignment for them as a number, evaluates the formula under that assignment, and quantifies (with a representable bound) over all assignments.
- Logical axioms. For each of the axiom schemas — quantifier instantiation , quantifier distribution, the identity axioms, and generalizations of tautologies — the set of Gödel numbers of its instances is representable.
The one remaining ingredient is the notion of a deduction itself.
- 1require is a sequence number and
- 2for each do
- 3if then continuea hypothesis
- 4if codes a logical axiom then continue
- 5if there exist with the code of then continuemodus ponens
- 6return false
- 7return true
Every test on a line — membership in , being a logical axiom, the
modus-ponens pattern via the concatenation — is a representable relation,
and the quantifiers over are all bounded by . So for
representable the whole predicate codes a deduction from ending in the sentence
is representable.
The characterization theorem
The catalog culminates in a converse to representability. Every recursive relation is representable, because a recursive is (by the subtheory) already representable by some formula using a finite consistent , and one can decide by searching for the least coded deduction from of or its negation and reading off which one it proved.
Since the reverse direction (representable recursive) is
immediate, the two notions coincide, and from here recursive
and
representable
are used interchangeably. The equivalence extends to semantics.
Any syntactic property with a recursive test is picked out inside the standard model by an arithmetic formula.
Provability is recursively enumerable
The coded-deduction predicate fixes the complexity of provability. Suppose is a set of sentences whose Gödel numbers form a recursive set. Then membership in is given by
The bracketed part is recursive. But the search for is unbounded: there is no recursive ceiling on how long a proof of might be. So the most one can extract is that is the domain of a recursive relation, a recursively enumerable set, not in general a recursive one.4 The two converge only under an extra hypothesis.
The argument mirrors the earlier result that a complete axiomatizable theory is decidable: to test whether the sentence is a theorem, search for the least coded deduction of or of ; completeness guarantees one exists, and which one turns up settles membership.
Church's thesis reconsidered
The recursive-equals-representable theorem also lends weight to Church's thesis, the claim that a function is recursive precisely when it is effectively computable. Suppose is decidable by some effective procedure. That procedure is a finite program whose execution is a sequence of simple atomic steps. By devices akin to Gödel numbering, code each machine state as a number; then the characteristic function of takes the shape
with a simple function reading the verdict off the final state. The recursiveness of reduces to the recursiveness of the step relation and of , and it is hard to imagine a procedure counted as effective whose single atomic step is not itself recursive. The syntactic coding is why the informal notion of computation and the formal notion of recursiveness are believed to coincide, a coincidence developed in full for recursive functions.
The encode–decode round trip is exact: distinct expressions get distinct numbers, and every syntactic operation has an arithmetic shadow. A formula of the language of , speaking on its face only of numbers and their successors and products, can therefore be read as speaking about formulas — and, evaluated at its own Gödel number, about itself.
Footnotes
- Enderton, §3.4 — the two stated themes of arithmetization and the promise that the resulting self-reference is exploited in §3.5 for undefinability and undecidability. ↩
- Enderton, §3.4 — Gödel numbers: the symbol table, the function , and the definition of a recursively numbered language requiring the predicate- and function-symbol relations to be representable in . ↩
- Enderton, §3.4 — the catalog (items 1–18) of representable syntactic relations and functions, each reducing an inductive syntactic definition to a bounded recursion on Gödel numbers. The catalog culminates in Theorem 34A (a relation is recursive iff it is representable in ) and Corollary 34B (every recursive relation is definable in ). ↩
- Enderton, §3.4, items 20–21 — is the domain of a recursive relation (recursively enumerable) for recursive , and is recursive when the theory is in addition complete. ↩
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